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ARGUMENT
1.
Judge Oddone does not seek a rule change. Judge Oddone seeks uniform
application of the disqualification and extraordinary relief processes.
The State has characterized Judge Oddone's argument as requesting both a rule
change and a judicial disqualification exception to extraordinary relief cases. This
characterization is incorrect. Judge Oddone simply seeks application of existing rules and
case law to the disqualification and extraordinary relief processes. Judge Oddone believes
that, in fact, a judicial disqualification exception has been created by the Utah Court of
Appeals and this exception should be rejected. As stated in the original brief, the Utah
appellate courts have consistently stated that extraordinary relief is not an available remedy
when interlocutory appeal or review onfinalappeal is available. Despite this case law, the
court of appeals has created an exception that allows judicial disqualification issues to be
reviewed through extraordinary relief, even though these issues have been and can be
addressed through

appeal. In the original brief, Judge Oddone suggested that, if

disqualification issues are to be reviewed through extraordinary relief, then a rule change
would be the appropriate mechanism, rather than acting contrary to other extraordinary relief
decisions and carving out a judicial disqualification exception.
misconstrued Judge Oddone's argument.

1

The State has thus

Since the filing of the original brief, counsel for Judge Oddone has recalled an
additional case in which a litigant sought extraordinary relief review of a disqualification
decision. In the unpublished decision of State v. Gibbons, petitioner Dale Moroni Gibbons
sought review of a Third District Court judge's decision denying a motion for
disqualification.

Copies of the relevant documents in that filing are attached as the

Appendix. The Utah Court of Appeals denied the petition, while conducting an independent
review of the affidavit.
The Court of Appeals has thus repeatedly determined that disqualification decisions
can be reviewed through extraordinary relief. Judge Oddone questioned the propriety of this
practice below, although it is admitted that the argument was not strenuously made, because
of the Court of Appeals previous inclinations. This case provides this Court with an
opportunity to decide whether the Court of Appeals' exception to extraordinary relief
practice is appropriate and, if it is appropriate, what type of review should be conducted.
2.
Judge Oddone's decision was not simply a legal conclusion to be reviewed for
correctness.
The State has cited InreM.L.. 965 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1998) for the proposition that
review of the legal sufficiency of an affidavit of bias is a legal question. Judge Oddone does
not necessarily dispute this conclusion when applied to reviewing disqualification decisions
on appeal. However, when reviewing these decisions through extraordinary relief, if that is
2

to be the course of action, then appellate review cannot and should not simply be an exercise
of offering a new interpretation of the affidavit of bias.
Extraordinary relief review of a disqualification decision combines issues of law and
fact. The appellate court can review the trial court judge's legal interpretation of what
constitutes disqualifying factors for correctness, based on the proposition that those are legal
questions. For instance, a judge's conclusion that disqualifying bias is only that which is
extra-judicial can be reviewed for correctness. If a trial court is incorrect in its conclusion,
a higher court could provide the correct interpretation.
However, disqualification decisions are often fact intensive. The Code of Judicial
Conduct is often explicit in its mandates, but the Code also provides only minimal guidance
in some areas, such as what constitutes the "appearance" of bias. Judge Oddone asserts that
this area often involves judgment calls that are entitled to deference. For instance, a trial
court's determination as to whether alleged facts or statements create an appearance of
impartiality is a discretionary call that would only be reversed if the appellate court, granting
deference to the trial court's analysis of the facts, determined that the trial court grossly
abused its discretion. If a trial court judge assesses facts in a manner that is inconsistent with
precedent, in the form of judicial or ethics advisory opinions, that might constitute a gross
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abuse of discretion. However, in judging unique facts, a trial court judge should be accorded
deference.
3.
The State's final arguments validate Judge Oddone's concerns about
extraordinary relief review of disqualification decisions.
In thefinalpages of the State's brief, the State spends considerable effort explaining
why Judge Anderson is biased against the Attorney General's Office and DCFS. The pages
contain additional material that was not presented in the affidavit, such as evidence of
additional federal court filings. Judge Oddone is placed in a difficult position with these
arguments because it is not his role to argue against Judge Anderson's disqualification. In
his order, Judge Oddone has set forth the support for his determination that the Attorney
General's Office and DCFS did not meet their burden of showing disqualifying bias and
prejudice. Judge Oddone cannot and should not otherwise argue about a colleagues alleged
bias.
Ultimately, Judge Oddone's primary interest is ensuring that he, as presiding judge,
has the ability to assign all types of juvenile court cases to all of the judges assigned to his
court. The Court of Appeals' decision has hampered his abilities, because of the blanket
disqualification, and because of the lack of deference to his analysis and conclusions. Judge
Oddone is a reluctant combatant against the State. Judge Oddone feels that, given the
important administrative concerns raised by this case, a party such as the State must show
4

deep-seated, personal bias before disqualification is warranted. Judge Oddone believes that
the State did not meet its burden of showing that Judge Anderson cannot reasonably handle
State cases. If this court ultimately upholds the Court of Appeals' decision, Judge Oddone
will accept the administrative consequences. Judge Anderson must separately manage the
consequences of being disqualified. These are, in many regards, separate issues.
As afinalnote, within the past few days, prior to the filing of this brief, this court has
taken action that seemingly consolidates Judge Anderson's Judicial Conduct Commission
proceedings with this case. This action places Judge Oddone in a difficult position vis-a-vis
prior court precedent. In a disqualification case, the challenged judge is not to enter the fray
by offering argument or comment about the basis for disqualification. The reviewing judge
is to conduct a review based solely on the facts presented. Combining these cases may
compromise that review. Having said that, Judge Oddone recognizes that the ultimate goal
for the judiciary should be resolving Judge Anderson's ability to handle juvenile court cases
involving certain individuals and entities parties. Whether that is accomplished through this
case or the Judicial Conduct Commission case is of relatively little consequence to Judge
Oddone. However, if this court seeks to address the facts concerning Judge Anderson's
alleged bias or prejudice, beyond a review of Judge Oddone's and the Court of Appeals
interpretation of
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those facts, then Judge Oddone will respectfully decline to comment or argue further on that
issue.
Conclusion
Judge Oddone is not asking for a rule change or special treatment. Disqualification
issues are carefully addressed at the trial court level and can be adequately addressed on
appeal. The trial courts should be given more deference at the extraordinary relief stage.
Judge Oddone will not argue further about whether Judge Anderson is biased. Judge
Oddone's analysis has been set forth in an order and that analysis will stand as the trial
court's statement on Judge Anderson's alleged bias.
DATED this _J_

day of July, 2003.

Brent M. JohnsoryXttorney for
Honorable Fredenc Oddone
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Utah Court of Appeals

JUN 0 7 2002
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Paillette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

ooOoo
Dale Moroni Gibbons
Petitioner,
v.
The Honorable Ronald Nehring,
Third District Court, Salt
Lake County; The Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick, Third
District Court, Salt Lake
County,

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
Case No. 20020414-CA

Respondents.
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.
Petitioner Dale Moroni Gibbons filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Relief seeking an order compelling Respondent Judge
Ronald Nehring, as Presiding Judge of the Third District Court,
to enter an order disqualifying Judge Dennis Frederick from
presiding over the trial in State v. Gibbons, Case No. 011909284.
Respondents filed a response, and the State of Utah filed a
limited response, which it said was intended to clarify the
status of the criminal case.
We determine the facts alleged in the Affidavit In Support
of Motion to Recuse/Disqualify The Honorable Judge Frederick are
insufficient to establish actual bias or an appearance of bias in
which Judge Frederick's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1). The
allegations of the petition are also speculative. Insofar as
there is any validity to concerns about Merrill Chandler
testifying in the Gibbons case while under probation in a
separate case also presided over by Judge Frederick, those
concerns would be best addressed by Judge Frederick's recusal in
Chandler!s case if proceedings for revocation of Chandler's
probation are initiated. We further conclude that the factual
allegations are insufficient to demonstrate any basis for calling
Judge Frederick as a witness in the Gibbons case because they do
not allege that the judge had any involvement in Chandler's plea
agreement that is not reflected in the existing district court
record. On the basis of the foregoing,

DARWIN OVERSON (7956)
MARK FLORES (8429)
CLAYTON SIMMS (8321)
Law Office of Darwin Overson, LLC
1366 East Murray Holladay Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
801-277-0325 / 801-277-0521 facsimile
KRISTINE ROGERS (06978)
Kristine M. Rogers' Law Office
8 East Broadway #712
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-994-6000 / 801-994-6094 facsimile

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DALE MORONI GIBBONS,
)
Petitioner,

])

-vs)
THE HONORABLE RONALD
NEHRING, Third District Court,
;
Salt Lake County; THE HONORABLE,
J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Third
}
District Court, Salt Lake County,

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE
65B(d), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND RULE 19,
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE AND SUPPORTING
MEMORANDUM

Case No. £dO<£6<J/4-CA

Respondents.
Dale Moroni Gibbons, ("Gibbons" or "Petitioner"), petitions the Court for
extraordinary relief under Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule
19(c) of the Utah Rules of Appeliale Proceduie in the form of an order directing

respondent to enter an order disqualifying the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick from
presiding over the case of State of Utah v. Dale Moroni Gibbons, District Court No.
011909284, Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah. The basis for the petition is set
out more fully below.
I

STATEMENT OF AFFECTED PARTIES
The affected parties in this action are the following: Honorable Ronald Nehring,

respondent and presiding district court judge in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County; Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, district court judge in the Third Judicial District,
Salt Lake County; and State of Utah, plaintiff in Gibbons.
II

RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioner seeks an order directing respondent Judge Nehring to enter an order

disqualify Judge Frederickfrompresiding over further proceedings in Gibbons.
III

STATEMENT OF CASE
Petitioner is charged with possession of methamphetamine, endangerment of a

minor child, and distributing harmful material to a minor, all third degree felonies. The
case was bound over to Judge Frederick after Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary
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hearing.1
On June 21, 2001, Gibbons' home was searched by Salt Lake County Sheriffs
under the direction of case agent Detective Doug Lambert, ("Lambert"), who had
previously secured a search warrant on June 18, 2001. Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 6^21. In his
affidavit in support of the search warrant Lambert relied on information he stated he
received from informant Rian Wilson and other unnamed informants and that the
information received from these informants was reliable and supported probable cause
for the warrant. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 6%2i & Rule 29 Aff Ex.Gatpp 7.002-09. Less than a

month after Gibbons was charged, Lambert interviewed Merrill Chandler, ("Chandler"),
an inmate at the Salt Lake County Jail, seeking information that would assist the State in
the prosecution of Gibbons. Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 4^15 (Ex. Dot 131 & E). Lambert wrote a
report of his interview of Chandler which attributed statements to Chandler that if true
would tend to assist the State in meeting their burden at trial. Id. However, Chandler
testified on April 15, 2002, before the Honorable Robin Reese, that he did not make most
of the statements attributed to him by Lambert in the report and that Lambert exaggerated

Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary hearing after adverse rulings relating to
the timing and sequence of an evidentiary hearing on Gibbons' prosecutorial misconduct
motion and his subpoenaing of prosecutor Sirena Wissler. See Add "A", Rule 29 Aff Ex. D Trans. April 11,2001 hearing before Hon. Robin Reese, at 31-33); Add C at 1-42 (Complete copy).
3

and misrepresented his words. Add. "A", Rule 29 Aff at 4^16 (Ex. Dpp 128-52.); compare Add. "C" at
128-64 with Rule Aff Ex. E (lambert's report).

Chandler was previously charged in three cases, District Court Case Nos.
001917097, 001917099, and 001917104, ("Chandler cases"), with three first degree
felonies with enhancements, a second degree felony, and six third degree felonies. Add.
"A ", Rule 29 Aff at 2^5 (Ex A). Prosecutor Sirena Wissler, ("Wissler"), was the prosecutor
who handled the three cases against Chandler. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 2%5 (Ex. A,B& C). She
represented the State at the change of plea hearing and at sentencing, and during all plea
negotiations between Chandler and the State, id. Each of the above identified Chandler
cases were bound over to Judge Frederick, id. at 2%7.
A plea agreement was reached in each of Chandler's cases identified above, and
pursuant to that agreement Chandler entered guilty pleas to one first degree felony and
two second degree felonies. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 2^8 (Ex B at 10). According to the
transcript of Chandler's sentencing before Judge Frederick, part of the agreement with
the State was that he cooperate with law enforcement in their investigations. Add "A", Rule
29 Aff at 2^9 (Ex. Cat 9%^ 2-10). Chandler testified on April 15,2002 that he was ordered by
Judge Frederick as a condition of his probation to cooperate with law enforcement in
their investigations. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at3%io (Ex. D at 157*^23-25). All plea negotiations,
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entry of pleas and sentencing took place before Judge Frederick. Add "A", Rule 29 Aff. at
5yi (Ex. B & Q. Judge Frederick sentenced Chandler to a term of imprisonment of five
years to life on the first degree and one to fifteen years imprisonment on each of the
second degree felonies. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at s%u (Ex. C at 12). The sentences were entered
to run consecutively but were suspended and Chandler was placed on 24 months
probation with one year to be served in the county jail id at 12 (Ex. C at 12-14). During the
sentencing, Judge Frederick made it very clear to Chandler that he was quite willing to
send Chandler to prison should he violate any of the terms of probation:
I don't want you to delude yourself into thinking that you've bamboozled anybody
here, because, quite frankly, Mr. Chandler, I was initially prepared to send you to
prison; and I will do so at the drop of a hat. So you best not give me any reason to
do it. Do you understand me?
Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 3y3 (Ex. C at 13^15-19). Just prior to making that statement, Judge
Frederick ordered the condition of probation relating to cooperating with law
enforcement:
You are to cooperate with law enforcement authorities incident to other matters
about which you have knowledge and the proposal you've made to make yourself
available for educational purposes to other persons who are like minded, and that
cooperation is to be forthcoming.
Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 3%13 (Ex. C at 13^1-5). According to his attorney, Chajudler was being
asked as part of his agreement to cooperate with law enforcement to provide information
5

to Lambert "on an unrelated cases (sic) and as a potential witness in that case." Add. "A",
Rule 29 Aff at 13 (Ex. Cat 9^2-10). According to Chandler's testimony, he was interviewed
by Lambert. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 4%is (Ex. D at 131 & E). Lambert's report of the interview
was produced it to the defense in discovery by Wissler. Add "A", Rule 29 Aff at 4%15 (Ex. E).
Chandler testified before Judge Reese as follows:
Mr. Flores:
Mr. Chandler:
Mr. Flores:
Mr. Chandler:

I'm going to ask you real quick. How do you feel about your
appearance today?
Frankly, I'm bordering on nervous to scared to death.
Why is that?
I have a current probation agreement with, on my case that
says I'm supposed to cooperate with investigations for any
law enforcement agencies. I believe I've done that in my
interviews that I had with Mr. Lambert and yet the words that
ended up on the paper were very different than the words that
I gave and I feel that it might be interpreted by - my
prosecutor is here and prosecuting this case, and Ifeel that I
am extremely vulnerable for telling the truth here.

Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 4^16 (Ex. D at 128 W0'21) (emphasis added). Chandler went on to rebut

significant and material portions of the statements that had been attributed to him by
Lambert in the police report. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 4%16(Ex.D at 132-152; compare Ex. E).

On January 15, 2001, Wissler, Lambert and Gibbons' attorneys met in an attempt
to resolve outstanding discovery issues. Add. "A", Rule29 Aff at 5^17(Ex. Fat 036B.010-017).
During that meeting, one of the issues to be resolved was whether there were any
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agreements of any kind with any of the witnesses or informants that were relied upon.
Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 5%17 (Ex. F at 036B.010, ^015^46). Wissler and Lambert represented that
there were no such agreements. Add. "A", Rule29 Aff. at 5%i7(Ex F036B.ois^46, 090.OIS%122, &
087.0UV22).
During the investigation of the Gibbons case, defense counsel learned that Wissler
had entered into an agreement on behalf of the State with Rian Wilson, Add. "A", Rule 29
Aff at 5%18, the named informant in the warrant affidavit executed by Lambert and
approved and signed by Wissler. Add. "A", Rule29Aff (Ex. G).
Contrary to the assertions of Lambert in the warrant affidavit, at the sentencing
of Rian Wilson, before the Honorable Pat Brian on March 9, 2001, Wissler stated:
Your Honor, / have had quite a bit of experience dealing with Mr. Wilson. When
this case was originally brought against Mr. Wilson, we had negotiated a
settlement which was to have involved Mr. Wilson providing information to law
enforcement.... Unfortunately, Mr. Wilson made gross misrepresentations to
both the State and its agents in the person of Salt Lake County Sheriffs detectives
about this alleged information that he could provide.... A lot of information Mr.
Wilson has provided to Adult Probation and Parole is not truthful.... He
deceived law enforcement. He deceived me,....
Add. "A", Rule29 Aff at 5%20 (Ex H); Add. "D" (emphasisadded). The warrant affidavit was SWOrn

and approved on June 18,2001. Add. "A", Rule29Aff ate^2i (Ex. "G").
Counts I & II of the information against the defendant in this case are based on
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materials seized pursuant to the warrant supported by the above described affidavit of
Lambert.2 Add "A", Rule29Aff. at 6^22. One of the defenses Petitioner asserts below is
outrageous governmental conduct in the form of the sheriffs officer, with the assistance
of the deputy district attorney, misleading the magistrate in order to secure the warrant.
Add "A", Rule 29 Aff. at 6^23. Another component of that defense is that the State, in an
attempt to cover up the prior misconduct, has resisted discovery by suppressing
exculpatory evidence and falsifying police reports. Id
Lambert's credibility will be a central issue at trial, and during many of the pretrial
motion hearings, including a motion to suppress and a motion for a finding of
prosecutorial misconduct, id at 6^24. At this time, the exact nature and terms of the
State's agreement with Chandler are still unclear, id at <s%25. In order to establish what the
nature and terms of that agreement were, the defense needs to interview Judge Frederick
to find out if off-the-record representations or discussions occurred relating to the plea
agreement. Judge Frederick is a potential witness in the Gibbons case, id at 6-7^25.
Chandler's testimony is critical to the defense. Add "A", Rule29 Aff. at i%26. His
testimony demonstrates that Lambert falsified his police reports and mis-characterized

2

Recently, the State has changed their theory as to Count HI and now intends to use
materials seized from Petitioner's home to prove Count IE.
8

statements made by witnesses, id.
A pre-sentence report was prepared and reviewed in the Chandler cases. Add. "A",
Rule 29 Aff. at 7%28 (Ex. C at 3%22-23). That report presumably contained information as to
Chandler's credibility, criminal history, family history, etc. as that is the purpose for the
pre-sentence report, id. It likely included a statement of the nature and terms of the plea
agreement. The pre-sentence report that is commonly used by judges to assess the person
who has come before them to be sentenced, id The State has not produced the presentence report in discovery.
Prior to April 3, 2002, Wissler and Lambert both maintained verbally and in
writing that there were no agreements with any of the informants, including Rian Wilson
-the named informant in the affidavit for search warrant. Add "A", Rule29 Aff. at 7%29
(compare Ex. "F" at 087.011^122, 090.015^122 and 036B.015^46 with Exhibit "G" at 007.006-.008 and Ex. H

at 1-3 and Ex. Dot 1-33 and Add "C" at 42-82,108-15). On April 11, 2002, Wissler reversed
herself before Judge Reese and for the first time maintained that in fact there was an
agreement and that Wilson only started to cooperate with law enforcement after his
sentencing. Add "A",Rule29Aff. ai7-8^29(Ex. Hat 1-3; Ex.Dot 1-33; Ex. Got 007.008;Ex. Fat

036B.oi4-.ois%40). Wissler's most recent position is inconsistent with her prior statement
that all information was received in 2000, Id, and with Lambert's representation that he
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spoke with Wilson in "mid to late November." Add. "A", Rule29 Aff. Ex. Fat 036B.ou-.ois\40.
On April 11, 2002, Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary hearing and Judge
Reese reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of preserving the testimony of Chandler,
Wilson and Ryan Morgan. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. Ex. D at 31-33. Wilson and Morgan each
testified on April 11, 2002 that they did not make the statements Lambert had attributed
to them in his affidavit for the warrant. Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 4%16 (Ex. D at 132-52; Ex. E); Add.

"C" at 42-80,107-116. Ryan Morgan, according to the State's Response to Petitioner's
prosecutorial misconduct motion, was one of the confidential informants relied upon by
Lambert in the warrant affidavit. Add. "E" at 12 (State's Responsettl 1) (identifying Ryan Morgan for

thefirsttime as an informant). Chandler testified on April 15, 2002 and at the end of his
testimony, Judge Reese relinquished jurisdiction to Judge Frederick. Add. "C" at 39.
Darwin Overson, Petitioner's attorney, filed a Rule 29 affidavit of bias or
prejudice, a motion to disqualify Judge Frederick, supporting memorandum, and
certification that the motion was brought in good faith, hM I

(>n May 3, 2002, Judge

Frederick certified the case for review by Judge Nehring. id. On May 24, 2002, by
written decision, Judge Nehring denied the motion to recuse Judge Frederick. Id. No
hearing on the issue was had.
IV

WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE R E M E D Y EXISTS

10

Petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him other
than an order of this Court. Extraordinary relief is available where the petitioner has "no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy." U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(a); see also U.R.APP.P.
RULE

19(b)(4); State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah App. 1998). There is no other

plain, speedy and adequate remedy because (1) Rule 29 only permits the filing of one
affidavit in a single proceeding; (2) If Merrill's testimony is shaded as a result of the
circumstances that exist, it permanently tarnishes his testimony in later proceedings; (3)
If Judge Frederick's decision is tainted by prior, preformed opinion stemming from the
Chandler cases, there is no way to determine that on appeal because this Court will defer
to the trial court's determination of credibility; (4) The complications presented by the
Chandler testimony are likely to taint the suppression hearing and other pretrial motions
impacting Petitioner's right to privacy and his First Amendment rights; (5) The integrity
of the judiciary will be tarnished in the eyes of the public; (6) The Petitioner's right to
investigate his case, call witnesses on his behalf, to a fair trial, to an impartial fact finder
and to due process of law will be denied; (7) An important issue to the management of
the judicial system will be avoided on review because a different standard applies after
conviction; and (8) If Judge Frederick finds Chandler not truthful and ultimately revokes
probation, Judge Frederick will lose jurisdiction in the Chandler cases and the error
11

cannot be corrected on appeal, which will likely leave Chandler embittered toward
testifying again.
A.

Only One Rule 29 Per Case

Rule 29 limits a party's ability to raise bias and prejudice to once in a proceeding.
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 29(c)(C) ("No party may file more than one motion to disqualify in an
action."). In the event that during the Gibbons case, facts develop that make it necessary
for Judge Frederick to testify, Petitioner is barred by Rule 29 from raising that issue a
second time.
B

Permanent Tarnishing of Merrill's Testimony

Should Merrill shade or alter his testimony as a result of the presence of Judge
Frederick and Wissler in the Gibbons case acting as a continuous reminder of the
precarious position he faces, his testimony will permanently be tainted. The remedy of
reversal on appeal will not wash the taint away. Merrill is an incredibly important
witness to Petitioner's case and any impermissible tainting of his testimony causes
irreparable harm to Petitioner's case.
C

Appellate Court Deference To Trial Court Determination

It is within Judge Frederick's broadest discretion to make a determination, after
hearing all the evidence, that Chandler is not telling the truth, that he is not credible.
12

This Court on review, should there be a conviction, would be bound by a long line of
cases to defer to Judge Frederick's assessment of Chandler's credibility. See State v.
Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App. 1989) (unless clearly erroneous, appellate court
defers to trial court's determination of witness's credibility); Harter v. Sorensen, 67 P.2d
1062, 1063 (Utah 1902) (trial judge, "having the witnesses before him, can observe their
deportment upon the stand, and is therefore in a better position to judge their credibility
and the weight of the evidence than are the judges of the appellate courts."). The
practical effect is that there is no review of the trial court's credibility determinations
unless they are clearly erroneous. Should Judge Frederick's prior credibility
determination of Chandler impact his credibility determination in Gibbons, there will be
no effective way to review it on appeal.
D.

Impact On Privacy And First Amendment Rights

During the search of Petitioner's home, officers seized a number of materials from
the Petitioner's master bedroom which qualify for the strictest protections under the law
of privacy and free expression. Should Petitioner be entitled to suppression and return of
these materials, and as a result of the complication Chandler's testimony presents in front
of Judge Frederick, should his motion be denied in error, Petitioner's right to privacy and
expression will be irreparably harmed. The materials seized are of the quality and nature
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that they should not be made part of the public record at trial unless they are evidence of
the commission a crime-which they are not. They are merely evidence that Petitioner has
a sex life. Government's undue intrusion into this area of Petitioner's life followed by
putting his sex life on public display is incongruent with the teaching of the United States
Supreme Court in privacy cases and First Amendment cases. These materials were
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 14 11( ihe 1 Nail
Constitution, and Petitioner will show during the pretrial suppression hearing that he is
entitled to the suppression and return of those materials provided he is given a fair
opportunity to do so.
E.

Integrity Of The Judiciary

Rule 29 is a procedural mechanism put in place to protect not only the party
seeking disqualification, but also to protect the integrity of the judiciary. There is strong
evidence that the prosecutor and lead detective acted outside of the law in order to
prosecute Petitioner. The evidence that the detective misrepresented facts as to the
reliability of informant Rian Wilson and that the prosecutor may have assisted him in
doing so casts a troubling shadow on our criminal justice system. Should Judge
Frederick be permitted to remain as trial judge over the case, it is likely to be perceived
by the public, or significant portions thereof, as an indictment of our system. That is not
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to say that Judge Frederick will in fact act inappropriately, but rather that it might be
perceived that he has done so. Under the circumstances of this case, which has received
extensive news coverage from coast to coast, the integrity of the judiciary is likely to be
tarnished should Judge Frederick remain as the trial judge in Gibbons.
F.

Petitioner's Rights Denied

Petitioner has a fundamental right to investigate his case, to call witnesses on his
behalf, to an impartial decision maker, to a fair trial and to due process of law. He will
be denied the opportunity to inquire of Judge Frederick as to his knowledge of the nature
and terms of the plea agreement between Chandler and the State. The record of the
proceedings is no substitute. There likely was an off-the-record discussion. The State's
representations cannot be relied upon in this respect as the State spent ten months lying
to the defense in the representation that there were no agreements with informants and
witnesses when in fact there were such agreements. The objective record in this case
bears that out to be true. Should it ultimately be necessary to call Judge Frederick as a
witness, Petitioner will either be denied the opportunity to do so, or his trial will be
significantly delayed during the period another trial judge is brought in. As stated more
fully below, the Petitioner's right to an impartial decision maker will also be severely
impacted by Judge Frederick remaining the trial judge. Such a wholesale denial of
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constitutionally protected rights harms the Petitioner in such a complete manner that
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy for such harm.
G.

Conclusion

If Judge Frederick determines Chandler is or is not credible and part of that
determination is based on his prior assessment of Chandler in the Chandler cases, there is
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy to correct that error because the reviewing court
on appeal will defer to Judge Frederick's credibility determinations. By extension, there
is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the abuse of discretion and error of law
committed by Judge Nehring in failing to disqualify Judge Frederick from presiding over
the Gibbons case.
V

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Judge Nehring applied the correct standard in prospectively

reviewing the Rule 29 affidavit is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State
v. West 34 P.3d 234 (Utah App. 2001).
2.

Whether the Rule 29 affidavit is "legally sufficient" is a question of law

reviewed for correctness. In re ML., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998); see V-1 Oil
Company v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997); State v.
Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998).
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3.

Whether the reviewing judge has any discretion in granting or denying a

motion to disqualify when the Rule 29 affidavit is legally sufficient is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979.
VI

AT THE STATE'S URGING. JUDGE NEHRING APPLIED A STANDARD
OF REVIEW THAT IS NO LONGER THE LAW AND DID NOT
FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OUTLINED IN RULE 29
OF THE U.RCr.P.
While Judge Nehring did not state what standard he employed in reviewing the

Rule 29 affidavit in Gibbons, it is clear from the written decision that he applied either
the retrospective due process standard or the repealed Utah Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 3(C)(1) standard. See Add "B" (Nehring, Order at 1-6). Doing so was contrary to this
Court's teachings in State v. West 34 P.3d 234, 234 (Utah App. 2001), and the
command of Canon 3(E)(1). It also appears that Judge Nehring did not follow the
procedure outlined in U.R.Cr.P. Rule 29, as mat rule requires the affidavit be reviewed
and that the reviewing court make conclusions of law. Judge Nehring also erred by not
holding a hearing prior to his decision.
A.

JUDGE NEHRING FAILED TO APPLY THE LEGAL STANDARD

Judge Nehring's written decision does not state whether he reviewed the legal
sufficiency of the Rule 29 affidavit under the standard set forth by Canon 3(E)(1) and by
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this Court in West or by some other standard. Add. "B" (Nehring, Order 1-6). It is clear from
Judge Nehring's decision that he did not review the legal sufficiency of the affidavit
under the Canon 3(E)(1) standard. At no point in Judge Nehring's decision is there a
statement as to whether a reasonable person, under the circumstances, might question
Judge Frederick's impartiality. No conclusions are drawn as to appearances of bias or
prejudice. Judge Nehring's sole focus was on whether actual bias ami prejudice had
been proven when it should have been on whether a reasonable person might question
Judge Frederick's impartiality, and whether there was an appearance of bias or prejudice.
See §VI(D) & (G), infra at 24-27, 30-33.
It is clearfromthe decision that Judge Nehring failed to follow the standard of
review established by Canon 3(E)(1), West State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 194 (Utah
1988). That was clearly a misinterpretation of well established law, see Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1991), and a failure to regularly
pursue his authority.

U.R.CR.P. RULE 65B(d)(4).

While in Neelev the Utah Supreme Court required a showing of actual bias or
prejudice to reverse a conviction or verdict based on a judge's failure to recuse himself,
subsequent Utah appellate decisions have consistently made clear that "actual bias need
not be found to support disqualification" prior to trial
18

Madsen v. Prudential Federal

Savings and Loan Assoc, 767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988); Alonzo. 973 P.2d at 979
(citing Neelev and Canon 3(C)(1) for proposition that judge should disqualify himself
where his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d
273, 278 (Utah 1989) O'udge should recuse himself if there is an appearance of bias and
canons of judicial ethics state that judge should disqualify if impartiality might
reasonably be questioned); State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah 1991) (judge
should have recused himself on own motion due to colorable claim of prejudice).
The Supreme Court in Neelev strongly recommended "the practice that a judge
recuse himself where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice..." 748 P.2d at
1094. The Court explained that the standard created by Canon 3(C)(1)(b) "should be
given careful consideration by the trial judge. It may require recusal in instances where
no actual bias is shown

[T]he integrity of the judicial system should be protected

against any taint of suspicion." Id.
The Neelev Court's recommendation became mandatory with the adoption of
Canon 3(E)(1). All Utah appellate decisions addressing the issue of disqualification
prior to State v. West were decided under Canon 3(C)(1), the predecessor to Canon
3(E)(1). Under the prior version, disqualification was discretionary. However, since the
adoption of Canon 3(E)(1) and this Court's decision in West il is absolutely clear that
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the obligation to disqualify is mandatory. The law is plain in this regard: "A judge shall
enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where.. .."

CANON

3(E)(1) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the standard Judge Nehring should have focused upon but did not
was whether based on all the allegations in the affidavit, a person might reasonably
question whether Judge Frederick was impartial. Instead, Judge Nehring focused
exclusively on whether actual bias had been proven by Petitioner. The burden Judge
Nehring placed on Petitioner in this regard was wholly inappropriate and a clear error of
law. Due to the limited timeframein which to raise the issue of disqualification under
Rule 29, it is unrealistic to expect a party seeking disqualification to present direct
evidence for every reasonable inference that may be drawnfromthe facts attested to in
the affidavit. This is doubly true when there is no requirement that actual bias be shown.
Furthermore, because the issue may be raised at any time in the proceedings, a party may
not have access to all of the facts, but only enough to give rise to the obligation to raise
the issue. By denying Petitioner's request for disqualification on the grounds that
Petitioner had not provided any evidence of an off-the-record discussion, Judge Nehring
acted unreasonably and against the plain dictates of Rule 29 and Canon 3(E)(1).
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B.

JUDGE NEHRING FAILED TO REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT AND
A TTA CHED RECORD

Judge Nehring's written decision acknowledged that Judge Frederick had
submitted Petitioner's "Motion" to disqualify for the purposes of review. Add. "A" (Nehring,
Order at l). It is, however, not clear from the written decision whether the Rule 29
affidavit and attachments were forwarded to Judge Nehring since the decision only refers
to the motion, and it is unclear whether Judge Nehring reviewed the affidavit and the
attachments thereto. Judge Nehring wrote: "This case was bound over to Judge
Frederick after the Honorable Robin Reese concluded, after preliminary hearing, that
sufficient probable cause existed to support the prosecution of Mr. Gibbons

" Add.

"A " (Nehring, Order at l) (emphasis added). Copies of the relevant portions of the April 11 * and
15th hearings before Judge Reese were attached as Exhibit "D" to the Rule 29 affidavit.
A cursory review of that transcript reveals that Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary
hearing in light of adverse rulings relating to Judge Reese's willingness to hear the
prosecutorial misconduct motion prior to the preliminary hearing. Contrary to the
finding of Judge Nehring, there simply has been no judicial finding with regard to
probable cause to bind Petitioner over to the District Court. That Judge Nehring wrote in
the decision that there had been a preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause
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strongly suggests that Judge Nehring did not review the Rule 29 affidavit and attached
record in determining legal sufficiency.
In referring to the agreement between the State and Chandler, Judge Nehring
wrote: "Under the terms of Mr. Chandler's plea agreement, which was approved by
Judge Frederick, Mr. Chandler agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. The
cooperation expected of Mr. Chandler concerns the communication of information
relevant to the State's prosecution of Mr. Gibbons which Mr. Chandler is believed to
possess." Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 2) (emphasis added). Judge Nehring either failed to review
the Rule 29 affidavit or seriously misconstrued the record. Judge Nehring apparently did
not grasp that the issue was not whether Chandler would provide such information in
cooperation with law enforcement, but rather that he had already provided such
information and the only issue was whether Lambert misrepresented that information.
This is apparent by Judge Nehring's use of the terms "expected" and "is believed to
possess" and by his referring to Chandler on page 5 of the decision as an "anticipated
witness." It appears Judge Nehring did not realize that Chandler had already testified
once in the case that he was "bordering on nervous to scared to death" and felt
"vulnerable for telling the truth" because he was on probation with Judge Frederick, and
Wissler, who is the lead prosec iiini in (he Gibbons case, was the prosecutor in his case.
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Judge Nehring did not acknowledge in his decision that Chandler had in fact already
expressed his apprehension in testifying.
C.

JUDGE NEHRING FAILED TO MAKE CONCLUSIONS
OF LA W ON CRITICAL ISSUES RAISED

Judge Nehring's decision failed to resolve several of the legal issues that were
raised by the parties and that were necessary to his determination as to whether Judge
Frederick must be disqualified. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23,
31-32 (Utah App. 1991) (abuse of discretion found where administrative body rendered
conclusions and decision without addressing legal issues raised by petitioner). For
instance, the parties were in dispute over the appropriate standard to apply for
determining legal sufficiency. Add "A". The State argued for application of the
discretionary standard employed in Neeley, which was a retroactive review decided prior
to the adoption of Canon 3(E)(1), and wrongly asserted that the "proper standard to apply
to determine whether a judge should be disqualified is found in the Utah Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 3(E)(1) and advises, 'a judge should recuse himself when his
"impartiality" might reasonably be questioned.'" Add. "A" (State's Opposition Memo at 3)
(emphasis in original). The Petitioner argued for application of the mandator/ standard
employed in West created by Canon 3(E)(1): "A judge shall enter a disqualification in
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a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Add. "A"
(Memo In Support at 8; Submission ofSupp. Authority at 7- 2; Reply at 4-10) (emphasis added). Judge

Nehring failed to make a legal determination as to which standard he should apply.
D.

VARIOUS STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR RULE 29
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS

Judge Nehring wrote in his decision that the "primary thrust of defendant's claim
of bias is that Judge Frederick has the wherewithall (sic) to exercise such a degree of
'control' over Mr. Chandler that Mr. Chandler will inevitably shape his testimony to
conform to his notion of Judge Frederick's interpretation of Mr. Chandler's obligation to
'cooperate with law enforcement.'" Add "B" (Nehring, Order at 2). Judge Nehring apparently
believed the standard required Petitioner to prove "inevitability" when in fact, all the
Petitioner was required to show in order to be entitled to disqualification under the due
process standard was "substantial risk". Again, it is not clear what standard Judge
Nehring applied, but Petitioner was not required to meet the due process standard in
order to show Judge Frederick must be disqualified. All that was required was a showing
that impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Thus, the only question under that
standard is whether a reasonable person might question the judge's impartiality. If so,
the judge must be disqualified.
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Determining which of the several standards to apply turns on several factors,
including the source of authority, the nature of the proceeding, the interests that will be
affected, the risk of erroneous depravation of that interest, and whether the review is
taking place prospectively or retrospectively. See V-l Oil Co. v. Dept of
Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Utah 1997) (due process standard applied
in administrative proceedings); West 34 P.3d 234, 234 (Utah App. 2001) (prospective
review under Canon 3(E)(1) in criminal prosecution); State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611
(Utah App.) (actual bias standard in criminal prosecution reviewed retrospectively),
affirmed 973 P.2d . 975 (1998).
i

Due Process Standard

The Utah Supreme Court explained in V-l Oil Co., 939 P.2d at 1197, that even
absent statutory or rule authority, due process principles require a certain level of
protection against a decision maker's partiality. In determining whether due process
requires the decision maker in an administrative proceeding be disqualified, the Court
provided the following guidance in determining the standard to apply:
The requirements of due process depend upon the specific context in which they
are applied because "unlike some legal rules due process is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances."...
Determining the requirements of due process in any given context involves a
balancing of three factors:
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first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional safeguards; and finally
the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id at 1196 (citations omitted) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Court, after
comparing the administrative proceedings to criminal proceedings and noting the
heightened due process concerns in the later, held that in the former context where "a
party to an adversarial proceeding can demonstrate actual impermissible bias or an
unacceptable risk of impermissible bias on the part of a decision maker, the decision
maker must be disqualified." Id at 1197 (emphasis added). Contrary to Judge
Nehring's decision, Petitioner's Rule 29 affidavit satisfies this standard by demonstrating
an unreasonable risk of impermissible bias or prejudice.
li

Prospective Review Standard

In the context of a criminal prosecution prior to retrial, this Court in West 34 P.3d
at 234, found that based on the authority of U.R.Cr.P. Rule 29 and U.CJ.C. Canon
3(E)(1), the correct standard for prospective review of an affidavit of bias is that a "judge
shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
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reasonably be questioned."3 Id. (emphasis added). This standard, to be used for
prospective review, is considerably lower than the standard dictated by due process
considerations post conviction. West, 34 P.3d at 234 (citing Ajonzo, 932 P.2d at 611).
The effect of the lower standard created by Canon 3(E)(1) is greater protection for
judicial integrity and fewer due process claims on appeal and in post-conviction cases.
When judging Petitioner's Rule 29 affidavit against this standard, it is clear that Judge
Frederick should have been disqualified.
in

Retrospective Review Standard

Under the more rigid retrospective standard, a criminal defendant on appeal after
conviction must show actual bias under an harmless error analysis. State v. Neeley, 748
P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). Petitioner was not required to meet this standard.
iv

The Proper Standard In This Case

Accordingly, the proper standard for reviewing a Rule 29 affidavit of bias prior to
trial is that a "judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." It is under this standard that the affidavit

3

This Court noted in West that in Neelev, 748 P.2d at 979, the Utah Supreme
Court relied on Canon 3(C)(1), which employed the term "should" rather than the term
"shall" employed by Canon 3(E)(1), which took effect on April 1, 1997. Both Alonzo
and Neelev were decided at the trial level under the prior version.
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in Gibbons must be judged when assessing its "legal sufficiency". Under this standard,
the challenged judge and the reviewing judge have little discretion whether to enter an
order of disqualification when the facts sworn out in the affidavit show that the judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned." That is, if the facts sworn to in the
affidavit show impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the affidavit is "legally
sufficient" as a matter of law and the challenged judge must be disqualified. Judge
Nehring did not apply this standard or else he would have disqualified Judge Frederick
since given the facts sworn in the Rule 29 affidavit of bias, Judge Frederick's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. See cases cited infra at 39-40.
E

JUDGE NEHRING MISPERCEIVED PETITIONER'S
CONCERNS AS A PERSONAL ATTACK ON JUDGE
FREDERICK WHEN THAT WAS NOT THE CASE

Judge Nehring wrote in his decision as follows:
I reject defendant's premise that Mr. Chandler's obligation to cooperate
with law enforcement is incongruent with a duty to tell the truth.
Defendant's assumption that Judge Frederick would terminate Mr.
Chandler's probation because he provided truthful but uncooperative
testimony would require that I adopt a degree of cynicism about the
fundamental integrity [of] our criminal justice system which I will not
entertain.
Add "B" (Nehring Order at 2-3). Judge Nehring clearly perceived Petitioner's position as
being a personal attack on Judge Frederick's character. That was the farthest thing from
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Petitioner's intent. Certainly Petitioner does not believe that Judge Frederick is going to
lash out at Chandler and revoke his probation merely because Chandler testified against
the State's interests. Rather, the concern is that there has not been any determination in
the Gibbons case as to Chandler's credibility, which is an issue that is central to the case.
Certainly if Judge Frederick knows that Chandler is telling the truth, he would not revoke
Chandler's probation for not "cooperating with law enforcement." Unfortunately,
however, a determination of Chandler's credibility is a judgement call that the trial judge
will be required to make. No one can guarantee Chandler that Judge Frederick will find
him credible and find that he is telling the truth. That is not the nature of our system of
justice. It is imperfect. Certainly Chandler has been informed that even if he tells the
truth, there is a risk that Judge Frederick will not believe him.
No one knows except Chandler whether he is telling the truth. Petitioner believes
Chandler was telling the truth on April 15, 2002 when he testified that Lambert lied in
the police report. The State presumably has a different view. Judge Frederick, sitting as
the trial judge will be called upon to make that determination. If he finds Chandler not
credible, he will likely find that Chandler has not cooperated with law enforcement and
by extension that he is in violation of the terms of his probation. No one can say at this
point in the proceedings whether Judge Frederick will find Chandler credible or not.
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That judgement, if made at this juncture, would be premature and wholly inappropriate.
That said, it must be decided at this juncture whether Judge Frederick should hear the
Gibbons case in light of the complications that the Chandler testimony presents.
F.

CHANDLER'S APPREHENSION MAY FOLLOW HIM
TO THE WITNESS STAND IN ANOTHER
COURTROOM

Judge Nehring wrote in his decision as follows:
Moreover, even if Chandler is animated by the fear that his probation might
be revoked, should he fail to cooperate with law enforcement, his
apprehension would follow Mr. Chandler to the witness chair in the
courtroom of any Third District Court judge. I am not persuaded that any
'control' Judge Frederick might have over Mr. Chandler would be
materially diminished by presenting his testimony before another judge.11
Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 3). Infrontof another judge, however, Chandler is likely to put
the risks he faces out of his mind long enough to testify. The presence of Judge
Frederick in the courtroom acts as a constant reminder of the precarious situation in
which he finds himself and is likely to heighten his apprehension. The State knows this
and has for that reason vigorously opposed Judge Frederick's disqualification.
G.

JUDGE NEHRING'S RELIANCE ONMCGEE
SUGGESTS HE APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD
OF REVIEW

Judge Nehring wrote in his decision as follows:
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Here, the defendant's claim of bias and prejudice can be traced only to
Judge Frederick's involvement with an anticipated witness who appeared
before Judge Frederick on an unrelated case. The weakness of this claim
for disqualification under Rule 29 is highlighted by the fact that our
Supreme Court has approved the practice of permitting the same judge to
preside over a defendant's preliminary hearing and trial. State of Utah v.
McGee, 473 P.2d 388 (Utah 1970). In the course of hearing evidence in a
preliminary hearing, a judge may be called upon to review the testimony of
many witnesses directly implicated in the matter which the judge will
revisit at trial. Clearly, if this practice has survived Supreme Court review,
it is implausible to believe that Mr. Chandler's involvement in the Gibbons
case would be found to be offensive.
Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 6-7). Judge Nehring's reliance on McGee further suggests that he
was applying the wrong standard of review. McGee was seeking reversal of his
conviction in the Supreme Court and thus, the prospective review standard would not
have been applicable. Furthermore, the McGee case was decided long before the
adoption of Canon 3(E)(1). In addition, the parties in McGee were the same and had the
same interests during both the preliminary hearing and the trial. Petitioner, however, was
not represented in the Chandler cases as he had no interest to protect at that time.
While it is true that the Supreme Court found no error in McGee with the same
judge presiding over the preliminary hearing and the trial, its reasoning was that since the
judge sitting as magistrate over the preliminary hearing was not the finder of fact at trial,
there was no risk of pre-formed opinions interfering with the fact finding at trial:
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In regard to defendant's allegations of bias and prejudice, a hearing was
held before Judge Cowley, who denied the motion. Defendant argued that
Judge Mecham, as committing magistrate, heard the evidence and formed
an opinion as to the truthfulness thereof. This matter was tried before a
jury, who acted as the factfinders;and therefore, the opinion of the judge
would be irrelevant.
Id at 399. The Court's reasoning suggests that it would have been objectionable had the
trier of fact been the judge in both instances. Such is the case in Gibbons. Judge
Frederick was the finder of fact with regard to Chandler's credibility and character at
sentencing in the Chandler cases. He will also be the finder of fact during pretrial
evidentiary hearings in the Gibbons case, and Petitioner has the right to waive his right to
a jury trial and have his case decided by the judge should he so choose to do so.
For similar reasons, Judge Nehring's and the State's reliance on Liteky v. U.S.,
510 U.S. 540 (1994) and Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977) was misplaced. See
Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 4) and Add. "A " (State's Opposition at 3). In both of those cases, the

party alleging bias and prejudice was a party to the prior litigation. In Gibbons,
Petitioner is a stranger to the Chandler proceedings and is being blockedfromexploring
the events that took place there other thanfromthe transcript as a record of the
proceedings. While the transcript may suffice as an official record of the proceedings, it
is not a record of everything that went on since there were obviously discussions between
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Chandler's counsel and the State, and possibly off-the-record discussions with Judge
Frederick. Petitioner is in effect being told he should be satisfied with what he has which
is nothing more than the cold record.
VII

RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE UNDER RULE 65B(dV2KA), (B) AND (D)
When there is "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy" available, appropriate

relief may be granted: "(A) where an inferior court,..., has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court,..., has failed to perform an act
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court,..., has
refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right... to which the petitioner is
entitled." U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(d)(2). Where "the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the
respondent has regularly pursued its authority." U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(d)(4). When the
issue to be reviewed under Rule 65B involves a question of law, "the trial court's legal
conclusion is granted no particular deference but is reviewed for correctness." Salt Lake
Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995).
"[W]hether a party's affidavit alleging judicial bias is legally sufficient is a question of
law." In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998). The Petitioner seeks relief
under subsections (A), (B) and (C).
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A

ABUSE OF DISCRETION UNDER RULE 653(d)(2)(A)

Under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), this Court may "direct the particular exercise of a lower
court's judgment to correct the lower court's abuse of discretion." Stirba, 972 P.2d at
922. This Court has previously explained that an abuse of discretion occurs when a
tribunal makes "a clear erroneous factual finding" or when it acts "unreasonably or
misinterprets] the law." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah
App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court has found an abuse of discretion warranting Rule
65B(d)(2)(A) relief where the district court judge made an obvious legal error.
Frederick, 890 P.2d at 1019-21.
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear in the procedural steps it
requires when an affidavit of bias is filed and since this Court's decision in State v. West
the standard for determining legal sufficiency is obvious.
There is very little or no discretion in whether to grant or deny a motion to
disqualify since the 1997 adoption of Canon 3(E)(1). If Respondent exercised any
discretion in reviewing Petitioner's affidavit of bias, relief is appropriate because Canon
3(E)(1) dispensed with the discretionary standard and replaced it with a mandatory
command by replacing the term "should" with the term "shall". The determination of
legal sufficiency is purely a legal question and thus, not subject to the reviewing judge's
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discretion. See U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(d)(2)(A); see SUPREME COURT RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, CHPT

12 ("'shall' and 'shall not' impose binding obligations to

respectively engage in or refrain from the described conduct.11); UTAH CONSTITUTION,
ARTICLE

VIII Section 4 & 12 (Supreme Court and Judicial Council rule making

authority); U.C.J.C. CANON 1 ("An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable
to justice in our society."); U.C.J.A, FORWORD at 1f 1 (1985 Article VIII amendments were
to achieve the objectives of "the development of a more efficient and effective judicial
system; the attraction and retention of quality judges; and the enhancement of the
judiciary as a co-equal branch of government."). Unless it would be patently
unreasonable to question the judge's impartiality, the reviewing judge must enter a
disqualification order.
B

FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY OF OFFICE RULE 65B(d)(2)(B)

Since Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1) is also a statement of the
duties and obligations of the office of district court judge, violation of Canon 3(E)(l)'s
mandatory command falls within the standard set forth in Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) where an
inferior court fails to perform an act required by law as a duty of office. Judge
Frederick's refusal to disqualify himself was in violation of Canon 3(E)(1) and was
therefore a failure to perform an act required by law as a duty of his office.
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The procedures outlined in Rule 29 for reviewing the entire affidavit are clear, and
the law setting the standard by which the affidavit must be reviewed is clear, and thus
Judge Nehring's failure to follow both the procedure and the law was also a failure to
perform an act required by law as a duty of his office. See also CANON 2 (judge's duty to
uphold the law and integrity of the judicial system).
C

DENIAL OF CLEAR RIGHT UNDER R ULE 65B(d)(2)(C)

Litigants are entitled to a judge who will hear both sides and decide an issue on
the merits of the law and the evidence presented. Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988). This includes the right to a judge who is
free from the appearance of bias or partiality. In the criminal action below, Petitioner has
a clearly established right to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf, the right to
confront and cross examine witnesses, the right to investigate his case, the right to an
impartial and neutral decision maker, and the right to a fair trial. The relief sought is
appropriate under Rule 65B(d)(2)(C) because absent extraordinary relief, a panalopy of
rights will be denied the Petitioner. The rights being denied are those core rights which
have been recognized through out our legal tradition as being the basic building blocks
of a civilized judicial system ofjustice.

36

VIII THE RULE 29 AFFIDAVIT WAS "LEGALLY SUFFICIENT" AS IT
STATED FACTS THAT GIVE RISE TO THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS
OR PREJUDICE, THAT SHOW ACTUAL IMPERMISSIBLE BIAS AND
THAT SHOW AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK OF IMPERMISSIBLE BIAS
A.

Other Courts Have Required Disqualification Under Similar
Circumstances

Under similar circumstances as those here, judges have been disqualified for the
appearance of bias or prejudice, actual bias or prejudice and because an unacceptable risk
of impermissible bias existed. See State v. Martinez, - P.3d- 2002 WL 554484 (N.M.)
(judge who presided over plea colloquy was disqualified from presiding over
reconstruction hearing in order to facilitate "unhindered testimony" of his recollections
of events at prior hearing); State v. Falcon, 793 A.2d 274, 277 (Conn. 2002) (judge
involved in plea negotiations should disqualify for trial); State v. Baver, 656 N.E.2d
1314, 1319-20 (Ohio App. 1995) (bias and prejudice may be evidentfromjudge's harsh
tenor and statements to defendant); State v. Fie. 356 S.E.2d 774, 775 (N.C. 1987) (judge
could not sit in criminal contempt proceedings initiated as a result of events occurring in
judge's courtroom in another case); Collins v. Dixie Transport. Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166
(Miss. 1989) (trial judge should have disqualified himself at hearing to determine what
transpired during settlement reached in earlier proceeding when he participated over the
proceedings and was called upon to make credibility determinations).
37

Judge Frederick has knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding and is a potential witness, which requires as a matter of law his
disqualification:
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. . . . (d) the
judge . . . (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
U.CJ.C. CANON 3(E)(1). Utah Code Annotated Section 78-24-3 authorizes calling a
judge as a witness, and under those circumstances it is in the judge's discretion to
postpone or suspend the trial in order to seat another judge. However, Rule 605 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence restricts a judge from testifying in a trial over which he or she
presides. Thus, Canon 3(E)(1) forbids a judge from sitting in a case where he or she may
be called upon to testify because of the potential for substantial disruption and harm to
the process.
Utah has a long tradition of judges disqualifying themselves upon the filing of an
affidavit of bias and prejudice:
The general practice in this jurisdiction has been forjudges to disqualify
themselves whenever an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them has been
filed. As a general rule, we think this is a commendable practice. The purity and
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integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion
to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the
integrity and fairness of the courts. This is not to say that the mere filing of an
affidavit of bias and prejudice, ipso facto cast such suspicion on the judge, and
upon his integrity and fairness, that he ought to disqualify himself. However, it is
ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself even though he may be entirely
free of bias and prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of bias and prejudice.
'Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing
it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of the
judge.
State v. Bvington, 200 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1948) (decided under prior discretionary rule
permitting challenged judge to determine bias and prejudice as in any other motion). The
tradition was practiced by some but not all judges across the State, but with the adoption
of Canon 3(E)(1), that informal tradition has become a mandatory duty.
It is contrary to our Anglo-Saxon justice system to permit a judge familiar with the
disputed events and persons to sit in judgement of those events and persons, and it does
serious harm to the appearance of impartiality: "No man can serve as judge of his own
case. . . . We doubt a more powerful principle may be found in our law. We have
labeled it 'the ancient first principle of justice.' . . . The principle's power extends
beyond the case of the judge-litigant to that of the judge-witness, to the case where the
judge judges his own credibility as a player in the events whose truth is sought." Collins,
543 So.2d at 166 & 167 n. 1 ("Our focus is upon the fact that the trial judge possessed
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knowledge of the (non)occurrence of events critical to the credibility of Collin's
witnesses and ultimately to divining the truth of those events."); Village of Exeter v.
Kahler. 606 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Neb. App. 2000) (judge with knowledge of facts being
adjudicated should disqualify); State v. Baird, 609 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 2000) ("A
judge's taking the role of witness in trial before him or her is manifestly inconsistent with
the judge's customary role of impartiality."); Vickers v. State, 17 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo.
App. 2000) (judge who is witness to material facts compelled to recuse for fundamental
fairness as guaranteed by state and federal due process clauses.). If Judge Frederick is
called to testify, who will sit in judgement of his testimony?
In State v. Bennett, 520 So.2d 1095 (La App. 1987), the Louisiana court held that
the trial judge should have disqualified himself under circumstances similar to those at
hand in this case. Id at 1097-98. There, Huey Long4 was indicted on charges related to
crimes Bennett was later charged with for his involvement. Id. at 1096. "Long entered
into a plea bargain agreement with the State whereby he agreed to provide information
concerning the crimes and testify for the State in conjunction with any other prosecutions
in return for a reduced charge and a lesser sentence." Id. Judge Broyles presided over
the plea hearing, conducted the plea colloquy and accepted Long's plea of guilty along
4

Obviously not the populist governor of Louisiana.
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with the conditions imposed by the agreement with the State. Id. Bennett was thereafter
indicted. Id. Bennett subpoenaed Judge Broyles to testify as to the nature and terms of
the agreement entered into by Long and the State, and accepted by the court. IdL Bennett
moved to disqualify Broyles but the judge reviewing the affidavit denied the motion
finding Judge Broyles not to be a material witness. Id. The Louisiana Court of Appeals
granted review and ordered Judge Broyles recused from the case:
The thrust of the defendant's argument is that the plea bargain agreement between
the State's chief witness, Huey Long, and the prosecution will affect the
credibility of that witness; the defendant is therefore entitled to attack Mr. Long's
credibility by exposing the plea bargain agreement at trial; that since Broyles
presided over the guilty plea hearing, accepted the agreement between the State
and Mr. Long, and agreed himself to be bound by it, Judge Broyles is a material
witness and will be called to testify about the plea bargain.
The plea agreement entered into between Judge Broyles, the assistant district
attorney and Huey P. Long imposes a limit on the judge's power to sentence
Long, if Long fulfills the obligations under the agreement. Long's obligations
under the agreement will be fulfilled by his testimony at defendant's trial. Long
will not be sentenced until after the trial. Therefore the control which Judge
Broyles has over Long's testimony has a direct bearing on Judge Broyles' ability
to conduct a fair and impartial trial.
Moreover, since Judge Broyles is scheduled to testify as a witness as to the details
of the plea agreement, which is material to the issue of credibility of Long's
testimony against defendant, someone will have to fulfill the role of ruling on the
questions which are propounded to Judge Broyles. It would not be feasible for
Judge Broyles to sit in the witness's chair and the judge's chair at the same time.
. . This also affects Judge Broyles' ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial.
Therefore we find that, under the particular facts of this case, Judge Broyles must
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be recused under LSA-C.Cr.P. art 671(6).
Id at 1097-98.
For the same reasons Judge Broyles could not act as trial judge in Bennett's case,
Judge Frederick cannot act as trial judge in the case against Petitioner. The control
which Judge Frederick has over Chandler has a direct bearing on Judge Frederick's
ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial. Chandler testified in the case at hand that he
had entered into an agreement with the State to cooperate with law enforcement and that
Judge Frederick made that cooperation a condition of his probation. During the
sentencing, Judge Frederick made it very clear to Chandler that any violation of the terms
of his probation would result in Chandler going to prison. Add "A", Rule 29Aff. at 3^13 (Ex. C
at 13%W5-19) ("at the drop of a hat"). Chandler testified in Gibbons that he was "bordering on
nervous to scared to death" because he felt it might be interpreted by Wissler that he was
not cooperating with law enforcement. He explained that he felt he was "extremely
vulnerable for telling the truth here." Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. (Ex. D at 128 1ffli0-2i;.
B.

It Just So Happens That It Looks Bad

In Gibbons, it just so happened that two of the absolutely critical witnesses,
Chandler and Wilson, were prosecuted by Wissler representing the State. It just so
happened that Wissler is the State's attorney prosecuting Petitioner. It just so happened
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that she entered into plea agreements with both Chandler and Wilson to cooperate with
law enforcement in their investigations. It just so happened that for ten months Wissler
denied the existence of any agreements between the State and any of the witnesses or
informants involved in the case and its investigation. It just so happened that both
Chandler and Wilson had in fact agreed as part of their respective plea bargains to
cooperate with Detective Lambert in his investigations. It just so happened that
Detective Lambert attributed statements to Chandler, Wilson and Morgan that were
incriminating of Petitioner. It just so happened that each deny having made those
statements. It also just so happened that the judge assigned to hear Petitioner's case is
the same judge who heard the three cases against Chandler wherein the disputed plea
agreement took place.
It just so happened that despite the fact that Chandler was charged with three first
degree felonies with enhancements, a second degree felony and six third degree felonies,
Judge Frederick accepted a plea to one first degree felony and two second degree
felonies and placed him on probation for twenty four months with little explanation from
the State other than that Chandler would be able to provide educational services to the
community about the dangers of club drugs if he were given probation. See Add "A" Rule
29Aff. Ex. Cat 9-13.
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Petitioner did not orchestrate this situation. He has just persistently tried to bring
it to light. The bottom line is that it looks bad for Judge Frederick to sit as the trial judge
in the Gibbons case-one which has received an incredible amount of media attention
from coast to coast. It looks bad for the integrity of the judiciary. See U.C.J.ADMIN.,
FORWARD,

1f 1 (objectives to be achieved by adoption of U.C.J.Admin). It looks bad for

the Petitioner who just wants a fair hearing of the issues in his case without information
that he has been denied access to interfering with the trial court's decisions and the
testimony of an important witness. It looks bad for the State of Utah at a time when the
public nationwide is becoming more and more concerned with abusive police practices.
There have been numerous reasons set forth by Petitioner as to why Judge
Frederick should be disqualified from hearing the Gibbons case and numerous arguments
made by the State and Judge Nehring as to why Petitioner is not entitled to disqualify
Judge Frederick. No one has given one good reason why it is necessary given the
particular circumstances of this unique case that Judge Frederick sit as the trial judge.
Neither the State nor the Petitioner have a right to any particular judge; only to an
impartial judge.5 Petitioner is not judge shopping. He just wants a judge who has no
5

Certainly the State would be seeking disqualification if the Gibbons case had
been assigned to Judge Brian who handled the sentencing of Rian Wilson or to Judge
Atherton who reviewed the warrant affidavit and signed the warrant. That situation
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pre-formed opinions as to Chandler's credibility and who will not be a continuous
reminder to Chandler that if he is perceived by Wissler and Judge Frederick as not
having cooperated with law enforcement, he is going to prison.
The only reason that has been put forth for not disqualifying Judge Frederick is
that doing so would encourage judge shopping. That argument rings hollow in this very
unique case that has been described by the Salt Lake Tribune as being the "convoluted
drug and child endangerment prosecution." Add "F" It is a rare case, thankfully, where
the defendant produces strong evidence that the prosecutor assisted a police officer in
making misrepresentations to the magistrate in order to secure a search warrant. When
that happens, the stakes are raised considerably as they have been in this case both in
terms of the parties and in terms of the public's perception of our criminal justice system.
A prosecutor representing the State of Utah may have aided another in committing
perjury in order to secure the search warrant in the Gibbons case. That same prosecutor
has it within her authority and discretion to file an order to show cause against Chandler
to revoke his probation if he does not "cooperate with law enforcement." That is within
her discretion and there is little anyone else can do if she decides upon that course, and

would likely create a serious concern for Wissler since she told each within a short
period of time two opposite stories about the credibility and reliability of Rian Wilson.
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there have been no assurances from the State that that will not happen.
Whether Judge Frederick, Wissler and Chandler's attorney engaged in an off-therecord discussion regarding the nature and terms of the plea agreement which might
color Judge Frederick's determination of Chandler's credibility has not been
substantiated one way or the other by the record. The State had opportunity to do so and
did not do so. Judge Nehring under Rule 29(c)(3)(B) had opportunity to do so and did
not do so. While the State represented to Judge Nehring that "the entirety of the State's
agreement made known to Judge Frederick is contained in the court record transcripts,"
Add. "A" (State's Response at 10), that representation is undercut by the leniency of Chandler's
sentencing and probation terms given the serious nature of the crimes, and by the fact
that Judge Frederick reviewed a sentencing report which has not been produced to
Petitioner in discovery. The common practice is for AP&P to assess credibility,
determine the plea agreement, and make recommendations to the judge for sentencing.
Common practice is for the sentencing judge to assess credibility of the person before
imposing sentence: the defendant stands before the sentencing court swearing he will
never sin again. Should he be believed? It belies common sense and experience to say
that Judge Frederick did not assess Chandler's credibility and that in doing so he was not
provided ample information about Chandler.
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If Judge Frederick determines in the Gibbons case that Chandler is or is not
credible depending upon how he testifies later on in the Gibbons case, it certainly
anticipates Judge Frederick's actions in the Chandler cases should Wissler seek to
revoke Chandler's probation. Chandler is represented by competent counsel and
certainly he has been told by his attorney that this is the situation he faces. Perhaps that
shades his testimony, perhaps it does not, but the risk is substantial and no one has made
any assurances to the Petitioner that Chandler will not change his testimony in order to be
perceived by the State as "cooperating with law enforcement."
Similarly, no one has made any assurances that there were no off-the-record
discussions with Judge Frederick regarding the nature and terms of the agreement
between Chandler and the State. While Judge Nehring cited Rule 11(h)(1) as a basis for
his confidence that no off-the-record discussion took place involving Judge Frederick,
the common practice in the Third District is for both parties to approach the judge in
certain cases prior to entering into a plea agreement in order to get some indication
whether the judge would accept the terms of the contemplated agreement.
It is also common to approach the judge off the record to discuss matters relating
to defendants acting as confidential informants. Had the issue of such practice been
brought to Petitioner's attention by either Judge Nehring or the State, Petitioner could
47

have directed Judge Nehring to the record of State of Utah v. Rian Wilson, District
Court Case No. 001910594, which has been made part of the record in the Gibbons case.
The certified copy of the videotape of the proceedings in the Wilson case, marked as
Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 to the transcript of the April 11,2002 hearing in the Gibbons
case, shows Wissler as well as other attorneys for the State repeatedly approaching the
judges to discuss Wilson acting as an informant for the State. Add. "D" (copy of video).6
Thus, it does happen and if it happened in the Chandler cases, Petitioner has a
constitutionally guaranteed right to inquire into those discussions. As the situation
stands, it is quite probable that such a discussion did take place and the Petitioner is
being denied even the opportunity to know about it because the State has not been
forthcoming and Petitioner cannot interview Judge Frederick. See UTAH RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.5(C)

(barring ex parte communication with judge

concerning the merits). If such a discussion did take place, and Judge Frederick is not
disqualified, Petitioner is going to be denied the right to exculpatory evidence, the right
to cross examination, the right to call witnesses on his behalf to testify, and the right to
have his case heard by an impartial judge — all of which are fundamental rights
6

The copy that has been submitted as Add. "D" is not a certified copy. The
certified copy has been made part of the record and is therefore with Judge Frederick
along with the rest of the record.
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guaranteed under Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the due process
clauses of the United States Constitution.
No matterfromwhat angle it is approached, Judge Frederick sitting as the trial
judge in Gibbons looks bad. For the sake of appearances, at the very least, he should be
disqualified and another judge assigned.
IX

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to direct

respondent to enter an order requiring Judge Frederick disqualified.

X

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The Petitioner requests the matter be set for oral argument as soon as possible

after the response time, seven days, permitted by Rule 19(c), U.R.A.P..
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J £ day of May, 2000.

Attorney for Petitioner
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